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ABSTRACT: The work of Richard H. Popkin both introduced the concept of skeptical 
fideism and served to impressively document its importance in the philosophies of a diverse 
range of thinkers, including Montaigne, Pascal, Huet, and Bayle. Popkin’s landmark History 
of Scepticism, however, begins its coverage with the Renaissance. In this paper I explore 
the roots of skeptical fideism in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, with special 
attention to Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, the oldest surviving text to clearly develop a 
skeptical fideist perspective. 
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The work of Richard H. Popkin both introduced the concept of skeptical fideism and 
served to impressively document its importance in the philosophies of a diverse 
range of thinkers, including Montaigne, Pascal, Huet, and Bayle. Popkin added the 
term “skeptical fideism” to the philosophical lexicon in the first edition of his 
landmark account of the role of skepticism in the development of early modern 
philosophy, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: Van 
Gorcum & Co., 1960).1 Essentially we have here a compound term, composed of two 
component terms, each of which is susceptible of a very wide range of meanings. 
‘Skepticism’ is perhaps the easier one to narrow down, since the meaning of this 
term must, given Popkin’s intended use of it, refer to some relatively extreme form 
of ancient Greek skepticism, and in particular to some Renaissance or early modern 
revival of Academic or Pyrrhonian skepticism.2 ‘Fideism’ is based on the Latin fides, 
                                                        
1 Popkin’s History of Scepticism has now gone through three expanding editions, the last of which 
extends his coverage as far as Pierre Bayle, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Searching for “skeptical fideism” in the Philosopher’s 
Index does not return any results earlier than Popkin’s paper “The High Road to Pyrrhonism,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 18-32. Searches done using the PhilPapers archive 
and Google also failed to return any pre-Popkin results for “skeptical fideism.”  
2 Popkin proposes that, for his project, skepticism is “a philosophical view that raises doubts about 
the adequacy or reliability of the evidence that could be offered to justify any proposition” (History 
of Scepticism, xiii-xiv). 
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meaning ‘faith’—hence faith-ism—and ‘faith’ is somewhat harder to pin down in 
this way. After all, as Popkin argues, Montaigne is a fideist, but Montaigne seems 
not to be a fideist in the same way that, say, Pascal or Bayle are.3 
So, we can begin by exploring some possible meanings for this term ‘skeptical 
fideism’ that emerges in scholarship focusing on Renaissance and early modern 
philosophy. Having done that, I want to look back and consider the history of this 
kind of view in the Western tradition. It certainly didn’t spring into existence circa 
1500 CE, unprecedented and new. I will be suggesting that the clearest and best 
articulated ancient version of the position resides in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum 
(DND), though we will also consider some earlier and some later texts, from Plato 
and from Sextus Empiricus respectively, which contain important elements of a 
‘skeptical fideist’ view and which no doubt contributed to the overall set of raw 
materials from which later figures, like Montaigne, could draw inspiration.4  
1. Taxonomizing Varieties of Skeptical Fideism 
If we think of a religion as consisting of a (constantly evolving and perhaps never 
fully determinate) set of doctrines and practices, then a concern for holding the right 
doctrines (orthodoxy) and a concern for maintaining and engaging in the correct 
practices (orthopraxy) will seem to naturally follow. Different religions might 
distribute their concern in different ways, some pressing the importance of 
orthodoxy, where others might emphasize orthopraxy instead. 
Taking this distinction as an initial point of departure, a skeptical fideist might 
combine some form of extreme skepticism (undercutting any claims to justified 
belief or knowledge) with the acceptance of certain religious doctrines. 
Alternatively, a skeptical fideist might combine some form of extreme skepticism 
with continued attachment to certain religious practices. Lastly, of course, a 
skeptical fideist might combine some form of extreme skepticism with acceptance 
                                                        
3 See Popkin, History of Scepticism, xiv-xvi. 
4 In his History of Scepticism, Popkin discusses Cicero as an important source-text for skeptical 
ideas for early modern thinkers, but Popkin does not consider DND as a source-text for skeptical 
fideism itself. Terence Penelhum, writing a couple decades later, does briefly consider Cicero’s 
DND as such a source. See his God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel, 1983), 13-14. For an excellent recent paper which considers DND in relation to both 
skepticism and fideism (though not skeptical fideism), see J. P. F. Wynne, “Learned and Wise: 
Cotta the Sceptic in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
47 (2014): 245-273. Indeed, anyone interested in DND should read Wynne’s paper. 
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of, and continued attachment to, certain religious doctrines and certain religious 
practices. As in the various religions themselves, a skeptical fideist of the third type 
(one whose view embraces both religious doctrines and religious practices) might 
distribute their focus in different ways. If you think of a spectrum, where one end 
represents undivided concern with orthodoxy (and no concern for orthopraxy at all), 
and where the opposite end represents undivided concern with orthopraxy (and no 
concern for orthodoxy at all), then think of dead-middle as representing equal 
concern for orthodoxy and orthopraxy, where moving in one direction from that 
middle point prioritizes doctrines more, and where movement in the opposite 
direction would prioritize practices more. This would seem to cover all possible 
distributions of focus between doctrines and practices. Toward the purely 
orthopraxic end of the spectrum, ‘faith’ is entirely or largely a matter of maintenance 
of and adherence to existing religious conventions. Toward the purely orthodoxic 
end, ‘faith’ is entirely or largely a matter of accepting and believing in the right 
doctrines. At the middle of the spectrum, ‘faith’ would mean a rich combination of 
both beliefs and practices. Note that for any of the views just sketched, what makes 
the view fideistic—rather than simply religious—is that fideists hold that their 
religious doctrines and/or practices cannot be rationally defended.5 Some fideists 
even go so far as to propose that their religious commitments may be positively 
irrational, in the sense of being not merely unsupported by reason, but of being 
positively opposed to the deliverances of reason.6 
Now, considered in these terms, I would place Montaigne relatively close to 
the orthopraxic end of the spectrum.7 However, there is no doubt that Montaigne 
also sometimes expresses himself in ways that straightforwardly suggest some 
concern for religious beliefs (orthodoxy) as well. On the other hand, thinkers like 
Pascal and Bayle might be regarded as skeptical fideists of the middle-spectrum or 
orthodoxy-end type, since their accounts of faith seems less about traditions and 
more about inner mental states like belief.8 
                                                        
5 Popkin, History of Scepticism, xiv-xv. 
6 For example, in his Historical and Critical Dictionary Bayle develops a version of this irrationalist 
form of fideism. See the article “Pyrrho” (pp. 194-209) along with the “Third Clarification” (pp. 
421-435) in Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, trans. Richard H. Popkin 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991). 
7 I have defended this view, though not quite in these terms, in earlier work. See Brian Ribeiro, 
“Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Exercises in Skeptical Cartography,” Modern Schoolman 87 (2009): 7-
34. 
8 For example, note how Bayle’s discussion puts a heavy focus on doctrines (and hence on 
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2. The Ancient Roots of Skeptical Fideism 
In seeking the ancient roots for the tradition of skeptical fideism, we can begin by 
considering the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. If one were arguing for the view that 
Plato’s Socrates is properly considered a skeptic, the evidence for that view would 
consist of pointing out his aporetic engagements with interlocutors in the so-called 
Socratic dialogues. What is friendship (Lysis) or piety (Euthyphro) or courage 
(Laches)—well, who can say? On the other hand, the evidence for refusing to read 
the character Socrates as a skeptic would surely include his apparently firm 
commitment to, and willingness to be put to death on account of, certain moral and 
spiritual views, concerning never doing wrong (even in return for a wrong received) 
and Socrates’ belief in an immortal soul and the possibility of divine judgment after 
death and the possibility of reincarnation and rebirth.9  
But note how these pro et contra arguments about Socrates-as-a-skeptic relate 
to each other: it is exactly this odd or counter-intuitive combination of extreme 
skeptical doubt and ready acceptance of religious beliefs or practices that 
characterizes the skeptical fideist. In skeptical fideists, the ‘faith’ doesn’t do away 
with the ‘skepticism’: the two are joined or somehow found to harmonize. Second, 
note that the various moral and spiritual ideas which Socrates accepts seem to be 
accepted without much in the way of rational defense. They seem more like posits 
or hypotheses, not like items of knowledge. To that extent, they would be consistent 
with a quite extreme skepticism. For example, in the Meno, after Meno’s skeptical 
dilemma is presented—we can’t search for what we know or for what we don’t know 
(80d-e)—Socrates responds by citing the views of some “wise men and women 
talk[ing] about divine matters” (81a).10 These people were “priests and priestesses,” 
though Socrates also finds the same view in some poets as well (81a-b).11 The view 
                                                        
orthodoxy). See Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, s.v. “Pyrrho” (esp. 199-204). 
For a clear statement of Pascal’s skeptical fideism, see Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. 
Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin, 1995), 33-36 [= Sellier 164 / Lafuma 131]. 
9 Drawing from the Crito and the Meno. See The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Even if the Meno is a late 
enough dialogue to be giving us more Plato than Socrates, the Meno still informs subsequent 
audiences’ readings of Socrates-the-character-in-Plato’s-dialogues. We are considering the 
question whether Socrates-the-character could be understood as a skeptical fideist in some way(s) 
or to some extent. 
10 Translations from the Meno are from Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, 
trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002). 
11 Apology 22b-c suggests that the poets themselves may be subject to divine inspiration in their 
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in question is the famous theory of recollection, involving immortal souls, 
reincarnation, etc. Does Socrates come to accept this view on the basis of its being 
embraced by religious figures and inspired poets? Seemingly, yes. Of course, Socrates 
does offer the questioning of the slave boy as support for this view, but he then 
concludes by adding that he thinks we will be “better men, braver and less idle, if 
we believe [this theory]” (86b-c). This suggests that Socrates’ theory comes from 
religious/poetic sources and that it requires some support from pragmatics (we will 
be braver, less idle if we believe it). I’m not sure if this is skeptical fideism exactly, 
but certainly some of the raw materials are here. We have the apparent inability to 
achieve rational insight or knowledge, combined with the attempt to seek 
inspiration—pun intended—from other sources like religious teachers and poets.  
Or consider Socrates’ frequent appeals to his divine sign (daimonion) in the 
Apology and elsewhere. Socrates begins his defense speech with the story of 
Chaerephon’s visit to the oracle of Delphi. Through the telling of this story we are 
meant to learn that if Socrates is indeed the wisest—as the oracle reports him to be—
this is only because he humbly recognizes his own lack of wisdom (21a-23c). With 
this Socratic insight into his own ignorance firmly in place, Socrates begins to defend 
himself, and explain his behavior, by making appeals to the divine, both in the 
message of the oracle and in reference to the urgings of his daimonion. In other 
words, it seems that when Socrates reaches the end of his elenchic rope and finds 
only aporia—because true wisdom is merely the recognition of how little human 
wisdom amounts to (23a)—then he must appeal to divine inspiration and divine 
assistance. He reports this as a regular occurrence.12 
Of course, this short account leaves a number of complications unresolved. 
Certainly, Plato’s character Socrates never self-identifies as a skeptic. And the nature 
and extent of his skepticism has not been discussed in any careful way here. Even if 
later skeptics claimed Socratic heritage,13 those claims must be critically evaluated. 
Moreover, the various moral and spiritual ideas I drew attention to may not align 
with any then-practiced religion or religious tradition, though perhaps this should 
                                                        
productions, explaining their connection to those “priests and priestesses” and their potential role 
as authorities on divine matters. 
12 See, for example, Apology 31c-32a and also 40a-c (where the voice is said to be his “constant 
companion”). Dan Larkin’s contribution to the Vanderbilt Ancient Epistemology workshop (April 
2018) provided an especially clear analysis of the fideistic aspects of Plato’s Socrates. Larkin’s 
reading powerfully illustrates how someone like Montaigne might have understood Socrates.  
13 For example, Cicero, DND 1.11.  
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not carry too much weight with us. Perhaps one’s ‘faith’ needn’t be a communally 
shared faith. Nonetheless, as I’ve said, there is something like the skeptical fideist’s 
combination of ‘skepticism’ and ‘faith’ in the character of Socrates, with Plato’s 
various dialogues being the first texts to even suggest that unique yet counter-
intuitive combination. For a later thinker like Montaigne, for whom Socrates looms 
so large as the perfect model of the philosopher, one can see how the reading of 
Socrates-as-skeptical-fideist would be possible and perhaps attractive: the searching 
doubts, combined with the humble piety, all tied neatly together in the ‘oracle of 
Delphi’ story, a humble searcher heeding his divine sign rather than trusting to his 
own insight. 
3. Cicero & Skeptical Fideism in De Natura Deorum 
Cicero’s Academica, which is entirely devoted to comparing and evaluating several 
versions of Academic skepticism, does not discuss the general question of what the 
Academic skeptic’s attitude toward religion is or ought to be.14 However, in De 
Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), the skeptical character Cotta does 
address this question, both directly and repeatedly.  
The puzzle is this: how can Cotta be both a pontifex of the Roman state 
religion15 and also an Academic skeptic, perhaps even a radical Academic skeptic, 
just as Cicero identifies himself to be in the Academica?16 In Book 1 of DND, Cicero 
describes what the “Academics” think, and one would presume that Cicero’s 
                                                        
14 For a recent translation of the Academica, see Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, trans. Charles 
Brittain (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006). 
15 The pontificies were one of the four major colleges of priests in the ancient Roman state religion. 
They were the most important of the four orders. 
16 While Cicero narrates the Academica and clearly identifies himself with Clitomachus’s radical 
interpretation of Carneades (Acad. 2.65-66, 2.78, 2.108, 2.112-113), one might nonetheless have 
the impression from other texts that Cicero was actually a mitigated skeptic (e.g., see the Tusculan 
Disputations). (For Cicero as a mitigated skeptic, see Harald Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 84-101; for Cicero and Cotta as radical skeptics, 
see Wynne, “Learned and Wise.”) As Wynn points out (“Learned and Wise,” 256-257), there may 
be a way to understand these textual tensions through the lens of Cicero’s claim that, even as a 
radical skeptic, his human weakness often leaves him holding opinions (see Acad. 2.66). 
Incidentally, 2.66 from the Academica provides an especially clear example of the “aspirationalist” 
reading of radical skepticism which I defended with respect to Sextan Pyrrhonism in Brian Ribeiro, 
“Is Pyrrhonism Psychologically Possible?,” Ancient Philosophy 22 (2002): 319-331. I wish I had 
been aware of this passage back in 2002, since it would have bolstered my case in some respects. 
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description would fit the only other Academic (viz., Cotta) involved in this dialogue, 
the dialogue which Cicero is preparing the reader to understand. The Academic 
skepticism described there in Book 1 of DND certainly appears to be of the radical 
type.17 If the other Academic, Cotta, held a different kind of view (mitigated 
Academic skepticism) from Cicero himself (radical Academic skepticism), this 
would have been a natural place for Cicero to inform the reader of that and perhaps 
indicate the nature of their disagreement. Yet he does not.  
So, if our puzzle is “how can Cotta be both a pontifex of the Roman state 
religion and also an Academic skeptic, perhaps even a radical Academic skeptic?,” 
then I think solution to this puzzle, in DND, is skeptical fideism. In fact, what I’m 
calling the solution to this puzzle is not hard to find in DND. There are several places 
in DND where Cotta’s priesthood is quite explicitly the topic of discussion. In each 
case where Cotta responds at any length, he describes his own view in skeptical-
fideistic terms. Take the first of these important passages—Cotta speaking: 
In this investigation of the nature of the gods, the primary issue is whether they 
exist or not. You [Velleius] say that it is difficult to deny it. I agree, if the question 
is posed in public, but it is quite easy in this type of conversation conducted between 
friends. So though I am a pontifex myself, and though I believe that our ritual and 
state-observances should be most religiously maintained, I should certainly like to 
be persuaded of the fundamental issue that gods exist, not merely as an expression 
of opinion but as a statement of truth; for many troubling considerations occur to 
me which sometimes lead me to think that they do not exist at all (DND 1.61 [24]). 
Here, although Cotta thinks the “ritual and state-observances should be most 
religiously maintained,” this is not rooted in his belief that the existence of the gods 
can be rationally defended. At the very most Cotta merely accepts that belief (in a 
fideistic sense), and it seems possible that he does not even opine that the gods exist. 
A number of passages in DND see Cotta admitting that the gods do exist in what 
appears to be only in a for-the-sake-of-argument sense.18 Admittedly other passages 
in DND suggest that Cotta does actually believe that the gods exist, though he clearly 
                                                        
17 See DND 1.1 [3] and 1.11-12 [6-7]. Unless otherwise indicated, all passages quoted from DND 
are from Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, trans. P. G. Walsh (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), and pages number references to that edition are given in square brackets. DND is also 
available in the Loeb Classical Library series: De Natura Deorum in Cicero, Vol. 19, trans. H. 
Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951). 




does not regard that opinion as rationally supported.19 Whether Cotta actually 
believes that the gods exist or not, since Cotta thinks that any religious practices or 
beliefs he does embrace have no rational support, Cotta’s view is a version of 
skeptical fideism—he’s an Academic pontifex. His fideism is directly driven by his 
skepticism. 
A richer passage comes later on, right at the beginning of Book 3. In Book 2, 
Stoic theology is expressed and defended by the character Balbus. Much of the 
material consists of the arguments of natural theology. Balbus then concludes Book 
2 by revisiting the issue of Cotta’s priesthood and insisting that Cotta, “as leading 
citizen and priest,” ought to embrace the Stoic arguments just offered. To argue 
against the existence of the gods, Balbus says, is “a debased and impious practice” 
(2.168 [107]). This casting down of the gauntlet sets the stage for Cotta’s reply, given 
in Book 3, which the reader is told begins with Cotta smiling (3.1 [108]). Cotta says 
that at this point he will “say a word about [his] own position” (3.5 [109])—he has 
so far mostly played the role of critic. Here is what he says: 
I take considerably to heart your authority, Balbus, and the comments at the close 
of your discourse, in which you urged me to remember that I am not just Cotta, but 
also a priest. The point you were making, I imagine, was that I should defend the 
beliefs about the immortal gods which we have inherited from our ancestors, 
together with the sacrifices, ceremonies, and religious observances. I shall indeed 
defend them, and I have always done so; no words from any person, whether 
learned or unlearned, will ever budge me from views which I inherited from our 
ancestors concerning the worship of the immortal gods. (DND 3.5 [109]) 
That Cotta’s fideism includes orthopraxy regarding the rituals and observances is 
clear. In discussing the Book 1 passage before, we saw that there was some question 
of whether Cotta’s ‘faith’ also includes any actual beliefs, or whether it was limited 
                                                        
19 “In fact I do believe that [the gods] do [exist], but the Stoics do not prove it” (DND 3.15 [113]). 
One might argue that passages like this one prove that Cotta is a mitigated skeptic (because Cotta 
admits to opining); however, Wynne (“Learned and Wise,” 256-257) provides a clear way of 
understanding such statements where they do not prove that at all (cf. Acad. 2.66, as discussed in 
note 16, above). Moreover, it should be borne carefully in mind that Cotta only professes to opine 
about the existence of the gods, a belief he finds “no cautery can dislodge . . . from [his] mind” (3.7 
[110]). This one case of opining, taken on its own, is hardly impressive evidence for claiming that 
Cotta is a mitigated and not a radical skeptic, especially given Wynne’s discussion. In fact, it seems 
to me that radical Academic skepticism in general, plus firm belief on the existence of the gods in 
particular, reads exactly like skeptical fideism! For further discussion, see Joseph DeFilippo, 
“Cicero vs. Cotta in De natura deorum,” Ancient Philosophy 20 (2000): 179-181.  
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to practices alone. In Cotta’s reply to Balbus in the passage we are now considering, 
Cotta raises this belief/practice question again by saying that Balbus would have him 
“defend the beliefs . . . together with the sacrifices, ceremonies, and religious 
observances.” Cotta’s response to Balbus’s demand is less than clear. He says he will 
defend them, and always has, though the tone in no way suggests a rational defense, 
but more a defense in the sense of refusing to ‘budge’ (or ‘move’) from the views he 
has ancestrally ‘inherited’ (or ‘received’). Moreover, the views Cotta will defend are 
those “concerning the worship of the immortal gods,” rather than views concerning 
their existence.20 Later in the same passage Cotta adds that in “any discussion of 
religion” his “guiding lights” are not Stoic philosophers, like Zeno or Chrysippus, but 
former Roman religious officials whom he mentions by name (3.5 [109]). This 
certainly reads like skeptical fideism of the more orthopraxically-focused variety. 
“So much, Balbus, for the sentiments of Cotta the priest,” Cotta says. Cotta says he 
will lend his assent to what his forebears have taught him “even when no rationale 
is offered” (3.6 [109]).21 
4. After Cicero 
When we turn our attention to much later thinkers who further develop and explore 
variations of skeptical fideism, we can see how these later thinkers could find 
antecedents of their view in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. We have already 
considered how the character of Socrates as he is depicted in Plato’s dialogues has 
some of the raw materials in place for that unique combination of an extreme 
epistemological skepticism and a fideistic acceptance of some religious beliefs and/or 
practices. However, in my view Cicero’s De Natura Deorum provides later thinkers, 
like Montaigne, with the most fully elaborated version of skeptical fideism in ancient 
Western philosophy. De Natura Deorum is both the oldest surviving text in the 
Western canon to clearly develop a skeptical fideist perspective and the most fully 
developed version of that position in Greek and Roman philosophy. 
                                                        
20 Here’s the important end of the passage in another translation: “I myself will indeed defend them 
always and always have defended them, nor will anybody’s speech, <a speech> of a learned man 
or of an unlearned man, ever move me from that opinion [me ex ea opinione . . . movebit], which 
I have received from my ancestors, about the worship of the immortal gods” (Wynne, “Learned 
and Wise,” 256). 
21 A third passage where the pontifex/skeptical fideism connection is made comes later in Book 3 
(DND 3.43-44 [122-123]), though the passage is not as instructive as the two considered above. 
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Sextus Empiricus, writing a couple centuries after Cicero, does provide his 
own brand of skeptic—the Pyrrhonian skeptic—with something to say about 
religion. The passages in Sextus, however, while they might suggest an orthopraxic 
and traditionalist version of skeptical fideism, also have a tone of pragmatic 
insincerity to them. Sextus presents more or less the same view in both the Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism and in Adversus Mathematicos: 
[F]ollowing ordinary life without opinions, we [Pyrrhonists] say that there are gods and 
we are pious towards the gods and say that they are provident.22 
[I]n line with his ancestral customs and laws, [the Pyrrhonist] says that there are 
gods and does everything that tends to worship of and reverence towards them.23 
Here we have the marks of orthopraxy—“without opinions” and “in line with his 
ancestral customs and laws,” the Pyrrhonist performs the appropriate acts of 
“worship.” But there’s also that note of insincerity or duplicity—the Pyrrhonist 
“says” that the gods exist, but surely the Sextan Pyrrhonist doesn’t believe they do.24 
This is the key point: a genuine skeptical fideist is not simply a skeptic who 
disingenuously keeps up the practices or professions of some faith. Cotta’s ‘faith’ may 
have no rational grounding, but it’s not disingenuous. The Sextan comments quoted 
above read more like a recipe for Hume’s later attempt to package (or camouflage) 
his corrosive critiques of religious beliefs with obviously insincere appeals to faith 
and the gospel that would fool no discerning reader.25 
In any case, for a thinker like Montaigne, to whom Plato, Cicero, and Sextus 
were all well-known and often-quoted sources, there are a variety of materials in 
                                                        
22 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 143 [= PH 3.2]. 
23 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, trans. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 13 [= M 9.49].  
24 Cf. the views expressed in Book 2 of Cicero’s De Divinatione, where the view articulated is closer 
to Sextus’ than to Cotta’s. See Cicero, De Divinatione in Cicero, Vol. 20, trans. W. A. Falconer 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1923), esp. 2.28 and 2.70. 
25 Hume does this in many places. See David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 164 and 186 (the conclusions 
of Sections 8 and 10 respectively); Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing), 66, 89, and 97. These various passages speak, in barely 
concealed dissimulation, of “mysteries” and “faith” and even “the gospel” and “divine revelation.” 
Not all of these passages are in propria persona, but many of them are. The reasons for dissembling 
on this topic are easy to see, particularly given the time in which Hume lived, so I don’t mean to 
be saying anything critical of Hume’s character here.  
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Greek and Roman philosophy for constructing a skeptical fideist perspective. 
Montaigne’s “Apology for Raymond Sebond” (Essays II:12) provides the central text 
for examining his skeptical fideism. One of Montaigne’s many expressions of the 
view, below, echoes familiar ideas from Cotta—remaining unmoved, holding onto 
one’s ancestral traditions: 
As I do not have the capacity for making a choice myself, I accept Another’s choice 
and remain where God put me. Otherwise I would not know how to save myself 
from endlessly rolling. And thus, by God’s grace, without worry or a troubled 
conscience, I have kept myself whole, within the ancient beliefs of our religion, 
through all the sects and schisms that our century has produced.26 
On first reading, Montaigne seems to go well beyond orthopraxy here, with his talk 
of “God’s grace” keeping him “within the ancient beliefs of our religion.” In my view, 
though, these statements of belief are at most statements of a tepid acceptance—
think of the ‘religious beliefs’ of the not-very-religious in our own day and age. But 
even if I am wrong, and Montaigne’s beliefs are genuine and deep, this would simply 
be his own version of the position, moving in the direction of the orthodoxic end of 
our spectrum. Pascal and Bayle would both move their versions of skeptical fideism 
even further in that direction.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have explored the ancient roots of skeptical fideism in the texts of 
Plato, Sextus, and most especially Cicero. I regard Cicero’s De Natura Deorum as 
both the oldest surviving Western text where this view is developed and the text 
which provided later thinkers with the most fully articulated ancient version of the 
view. Historical transformations between Cicero’s time and Montaigne’s made it the 
case that they were considering very different religious ‘faiths’ when they sought to 
harmonize their skepticism with their faith. Cicero’s Academic pontifex and 
Montaigne’s Catholic Pyrrhonist may, therefore, raise different questions for us. 
Montaigne, who we have only briefly discussed, certainly seems to broaden the 
position’s possibilities in ways which qualify as original and which tell us something 
about the changing nature of religion in Western history. Later skeptical fideists like 
                                                        
26 Michel de Montaigne, An Apology for Raymond Sebond, trans. M. A. Screech (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1993), 149.  
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Pascal and Bayle provide further variations of skeptical fideism, which in turn 
inspired philosophers of religion and theologians down to the present day.27 
                                                        
27 I would like to thank all of the participants in the Ancient Epistemology Workshop held at 
Vanderbilt University in April 2018 for their insightful questions and many helpful suggestions. 
In addition, my very special thanks go to Scott Aikin, Harald Thorsrud, and Dan Larkin for the 
stimulating conversations I had with each of them. 
